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BOUNCING THE PROVERBIAL BLANK CHECK: AN 
ARGUMENT FOR INCLUDING CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE HOBBS ACT 
Jennifer Lada* ** 
Abstract 
The Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951, criminalizes bribery of 
and extortion by public officials. Under the statute, “‘extortion’ means 
the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by 
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under 
color of official right.” But the meaning of “under color of official 
right” remains ambiguous. This Note examines the ambiguity created 
by the phrase “under color of official right” to decide whether a 
candidate for public office can be held accountable under the Hobbs Act 
for extortion. More specifically, this Note addresses whether a candidate 
for office qualifies as a public official who can violate § 1951(a) of the 
Hobbs Act by accepting a bribe in return for a promise of future action 
if the candidate is elected. 
This Note argues that candidates for public office who accept bribes 
in return for a promise of future action ought to be, and in fact are, 
prosecutable under the Hobbs Act. Excluding candidates for public 
office from the reach of the Hobbs Act would be inconsistent with 
public policy. Indeed, this would be fundamentally inconsistent with 
basic Western sensibilities, which recognize that public official 
corruption “destroys democracy, replacing the vote of the people with 
the vote of the dollar.” Because of uncertainty as to whether the Hobbs 
Act applies to candidates for public office, prosecutors usually rely on 
18 U.S.C. § 599, titled “Promise of appointment by candidate,” as an 
alternative to prosecute candidates for office who receive bribes. Under 
this weaker statutory alternative, a candidate for office who takes a 
bribe during an election faces at most two years in prison for his crime, 
compared to a maximum of twenty years in prison if the candidate is 
prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. This effectively hobbles the Hobbs 
Act, stripping away its significant deterrent value for non-incumbent 
candidates. Therefore, courts should stop bouncing the proverbial blank 
check, and treat candidates for office as public officials who can violate 
the Hobbs Act by accepting bribes in return for promised official action 
once elected. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Editor’s Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note in Spring 2014. 
 ** J.D. candidate 2015, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2012, Mercer 
University. I would like to thank the editors and fellow members of Florida Law Review for 
their hard work, diligence, and dedication throughout the editing process. I would like to thank 
in particular Kathleen Carlson and Dane Ullian for their careful review and suggestions 
regarding early drafts of this work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an election in the fall of 2014. Mayor Carmine Polito is 
running for reelection in his hometown of Camden, New Jersey.1 
During his campaign, Mayor Polito receives money from a small local 
advocate group in exchange for his promise of future action if he is 
reelected. Mayor Polito’s ultimate goal when making the promise is to 
create jobs for his community members and revitalize the city. Polito, 
however, does not declare the small amount of money he receives. In 
this situation, the federal government may imprison Mayor Polito for up 
to twenty years for extortion “under color of official right” under the 
Hobbs Act.2 
Now consider a different scenario: Mayor Polito’s challenger, Victor 
                                                                                                                     
 1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the movie American Hustle. See AMERICAN 
HUSTLE (Columbia Pictures Dec. 13, 2013). 
 2. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
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Taleggio, in exchange for several million dollars, also promises future 
action if he is elected. Unbeknownst to the community, Taleggio’s 
promise of future action would damage the small city of Camden. Yet, 
if Taleggio does not win the election, he only faces imprisonment for up 
to two years, even though his act was worse in every way than Mayor 
Polito’s, and even though it took place in a political campaign for the 
same office.3 This outcome stems from the recent holding of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Manzo.4 To 
support this counterintuitive holding the Third Circuit reasoned that the 
Hobbs Act does not proscribe extortion by a losing non-incumbent 
candidate because a losing candidate cannot extort “under color of 
official right.”5 But does the Hobbs Act really make this distinction? 
Under the Hobbs Act, “‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property 
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”6 The 
Hobbs Act criminalizes extortion, attempted extortion, or conspiracy to 
extort “under color of official right.”7 Yet, the meaning of “under color 
of official right” remains ambiguous.8 This Note examines the 
ambiguity created by the “under color of official right” language to 
determine whether a candidate for public office can be held accountable 
under the Hobbs Act for extortion “under color of official right.” More 
specifically, this Note investigates whether a candidate for office is 
considered a public official who can violate § 1951(a) of the Hobbs Act 
by accepting a bribe in return for a promise of future action. 
Modern societies have reached a general consensus about the 
illegality of public official corruption.9 Society views public official 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 599. With the unavailability of the Hobbs Act to prosecute non-
incumbent candidates, 18 U.S.C. § 599, which only provides for a maximum of two years in 
prison, is the main tool to prosecute a candidate like Taleggio in this scenario. See infra note 21 
and accompanying text.  
 4. 636 F.3d 56, 69 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a candidate for public office who 
received a bribe in exchange for a promise of future action once elected could not be acting 
“under the color of official right” under the Hobbs Act). 
 5. Id. at 65. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Manzo, 636 F.3d at 62 (“[C]ourts have grappled with ambiguity embedded 
in the text of the Hobbs Act, and in particular, the ‘under color of official right’ language.”); 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 275 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“‘[T]he phrase 
“under color of official right,” standing alone, is vague almost to the point of 
unconstitutionality.’” (quoting United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 695 (2d Cir. 1984) (en 
banc) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))). 
 9. See Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and 
the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 894, 896–97 (2013); Jeremy 
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corruption, which includes extortion and bribery, not only as illegal 
behavior, but also as normatively wrongful conduct.10 Corruption of 
public officials gives an unfair advantage to those who are able to pay, 
while the general public suffers from inflated costs and a loss of faith in 
government.11 In recent decades, one of the U.S. government’s major 
objectives has been to investigate and reduce acts of corruption by 
public officials.12 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, has 
made reducing public corruption an official top priority for the past 
several years.13 As Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern 
District of Illinois, stated: “Vigorous prosecution of public corruption 
has always been vital to our country.”14 Furthermore, reduced funding 
at all levels of government means that vigorous prosecution of public 
official corruption is more important than ever.15 
The Hobbs Act is a strong tool to prosecute public officials for 
extorting or receiving bribes,16 and “under color of official right” 
                                                                                                                     
N. Gayed, Note, “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an Essential Element for Hobbs 
Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1731, 1733 (2003). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Patrick Fitzgerald, The Costs of Public Corruption – And the Need for the Public to 
Fight Back, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/
fin/corruption.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). For a more detailed explanation of the 
definition of corruption and the negative effects of corruption on societies across the world, see 
generally Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, WORLD BANK, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2014). 
 12. See Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions? The 
Ambiguous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 
65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 230 (2012) (“Presently, investigating public corruption ranks first 
among the FBI’s criminal priorities—the most common forms of which include bribery and 
extortion.” (footnote omitted)); cf. John L. Diamond, Reviving Lenity and Honest Belief at the 
Boundaries of Criminal Law, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 22 (2010) (“Bribery, like political 
extortion, is at the center of political corruption cases.”); Ilissa B. Gold, Note, Explicit, Express, 
and Everything in Between: The Quid Pro Quo Requirement for Bribery and Hobbs Act 
Prosecutions in the 2000s, 36 WASH. U. J.L & POL’Y 261, 264–66 (2011) (noting the increased 
application of the Hobbs Act “to public officials for government corruption”). 
 13. Garcia, supra note 12, at 230. 
 14. Fitzgerald, supra note 11. 
 15. Id. 
 16. James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the 
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 861 (1988); Peter D. Hardy, Note, The 
Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corruption Prosecutions Under the 
Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 409, 456 (1995) (“[T]he Hobbs Act remains one of the most 
potent weapons for combating local and public corruption.”); CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-
131.00, at 2404, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9
crm02404.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
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prosecutions are widely recognized today.17 Courts have consistently 
recognized the legitimacy of the Hobbs Act.18 The Hobbs Act provides 
severe sentencing guidelines for public official extortion “under color of 
official right”: up to twenty years of imprisonment, monetary penalties, 
or both.19 
Failing to include candidates for public office in the Hobbs Act is 
inconsistent with public policy. Indeed, this failure is fundamentally 
inconsistent with basic Western sensibilities, which recognize that 
public official corruption “destroys democracy, replacing the vote of the 
people with the vote of the dollar.”20 Because prosecutors cannot use 
the Hobbs Act to prosecute non-incumbent candidates, they must 
usually rely on 18 U.S.C. § 599, titled “Promise of appointment by 
candidate,” as an alternative to prosecute such candidates for public 
office who receive bribes.21 Under this weaker statutory alternative, a 
candidate for office who took a bribe during an election faces two years 
in prison, at most, compared to a maximum of twenty years for an 
officeholder prosecuted under the Hobbs Act.22  
This Note argues that courts should stop bouncing the proverbial 
blank check when interpreting the Hobbs Act.  Candidates for public 
office who accept bribes in return for a promise of future action should 
be, and in fact are, prosecutable under the Hobbs Act for extortion 
“under color of official right.” The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I 
introduces the historical context and modern application of the Hobbs 
Act. Part II argues that the purpose of the Hobbs Act is best served by 
reading “under color of official right” as applicable to candidates for 
public office who accept bribes. Part III shows that candidates for 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-131.00, at 2404, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02404.htm (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2014) (listing cases where the Department of Justice successfully prosecuted 
individuals for extortion “under color of official right”); Lindgren, supra note 16, at 905 
(referring to the Hobbs Act as “a current darling of the federal prosecutor’s nursery”). 
 18. CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-131.00, at 2404, available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02404.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 19. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012). 
 20. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 225 (2002). 
 21. See 18 U.S.C. § 599 (“Whoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly promises or 
pledges the appointment, or the use of his influence or support for the appointment of any 
person to any public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring support in 
his candidacy shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if 
the violation was willful, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.”). 
 22. Compare id. (providing that a candidate taking bribes prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 599 “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both”), with id. § 1951(a) 
(providing that a person prosecuted under the Hobbs Act “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not 
more than twenty years, or both”). 
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public office receiving money in exchange for future acts are, at 
minimum, attempting or conspiring to extort money “under color of 
official right,” which are inchoate crimes explicitly prosecutable under 
the Hobbs Act. Finally, Part IV discusses why the government should 
be able to directly prosecute non-incumbent candidates for public office 
for extortion “under color of official right” based on the phrase’s 
ambiguity and the use of similar language that has allowed for the 
prosecution of non-state actors in civil rights cases. 
I.  THE HOBBS ACT: AN INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY  
This Part introduces the historical context of the Hobbs Act. It 
surveys the early common law background behind the Act and 
summarizes some of the gloss courts have provided in significant 
decisions since its adoption. 
A.  The Hobbs Act as Codified: 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
“Corruption” encompasses a broad range of crimes, including 
extortion, bribery, fraud, racketeering, and other similar acts.23 Early 
common law prohibitions of extortion originated from the Magna Carta 
principle that the rights of citizens cannot be bought or sold.24 Early 
common law definitions of extortion focused on unwarranted takings by 
public officials.25 Sir William Blackstone, for instance, defined 
extortion as “an abuse of public justice, which consists in any officer’s 
unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man any money or 
thing of value, that is not due him, or more than is due, or before it is 
due.”26 
The Hobbs Act modified the common law meaning of extortion. The 
Act governs both extortion by public officials “under color of official 
right” and private extortion “induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear,”27 which greatly expands the 
common law definition.28  
B.  A Historical Perspective of the Hobbs Act 
Initially, Congress passed the Hobbs Act as an amendment to the 
                                                                                                                     
 23. John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs 
Act and Other Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 387 (2011). 
 24. Id. at 396. 
 25. Lindgren, supra note 16, at 847. 
 26. WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 459 (9th ed. 1915). 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). 
 28. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 261 (1992). 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/7
2015] BOUNCING THE PROVERBIAL BLANK CHECK 369 
 
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.29 The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 
was passed to “protect trade and commerce against interference by 
violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation.”30 Congress originally 
intended this Act to punish organized crime,31 and did not even mention 
preventing political corruption.32 In 1941, seven years after Congress 
enacted the Anti-Racketeering Act, the Supreme Court first considered 
the Act’s scope in United States v. Local 807.33 The Court’s 
interpretation of the Anti-Racketeering Act became widely unpopular 
and this led Congress to promptly amend that Act with the Hobbs Act in 
1946.34 
Congress originally intended for the Hobbs Act to narrowly “combat 
extortion and robbery on the part of organized crime and certain labor 
movements”35 and prevent labor racketeering activities.36 Congress 
never discussed the meaning of “under color of official right,”37 perhaps 
because it never explicitly intended the Hobbs Act to be a weapon 
against political corruption.38 Congress did, however, omit § 3(a) of the 
Anti-Racketeering Act from the Hobbs Act.39 Section 3(a) of the Anti-
Racketeering Act narrowly defined “wrongful” as acts done “in 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States” in reference to the 
Act’s use of “wrongful” in the phrase “wrongful use of force or fear, or 
under color of official right.”40 Congress excluded § 3(a) from the 
Hobbs Act to provide greater prosecutorial latitude on both the federal 
and state levels.41 This omission allowed prosecutors to use the Hobbs 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979, repealed by 
Hobbs Act, Pub. L. No. 79-537, 60 Stat. 420 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951); see 
also Gayed, supra note 9, at 1752 & n.129. 
 30. See Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979–80. 
 31. See S. REP. NO. 73–1440, at 1 (1934); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1833 (1934). 
 32. Gayed, supra note 9, at 1753; see also Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at 
979–80. 
 33. 315 U.S. 521 (1942), superseded by statute, Hobbs Act, 60 Stat. at 420, as recognized 
in Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003). 
 34. Gayed, supra note 9, at 1755. 
 35. Medrith Lee Hager, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the Distinction Between a Bribe and 
a Gift, 83 KY. L. J. 197, 203 (1994–95). 
 36. Gold, supra note 12, at 264. 
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1833 (1934); see also Joseph Maurice Harary, Note, 
Misapplication of the Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1346 (1985). 
 38. Gayed, supra note 9, at 1756. 
 39. Compare Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979, with Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951. 
 40. Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at 980. 
 41. See Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., The Expanding Role of Federal Prosecutors in 
Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 CUMB. L. REV. 385, 390–93 (1977) 
(describing the expansion and development of the “color-of-official-right doctrine”); Randy J. 
Curato et al., Note, Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting 
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Act as a weapon against a wider range of corrupt acts, which later 
included public official corruption.42 
In United States v. Kenny,43 federal prosecutors urged the Third 
Circuit to revise the definition of “under color of official right.”44 The 
defendants in Kenny were public officials who had allegedly received 
kickback payments from contractors.45 The prosecutors charged the 
defendants under two theories of extortion: (1) “wrongful use of fear” 
and (2) “under color of official right.”46 The Third Circuit affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction and defined extortion “under color of official 
right” as “the wrongful taking by a public officer of money not due him 
or his office, whether or not the taking was accomplished by force, 
threats or use of fear.”47 The Third Circuit held that the Hobbs Act 
applied to public officials who extort without the use of force, fear, or 
violence.48 Almost every other United States Court of Appeals has 
followed the Third Circuit’s holding in Kenny.49 Today, the Hobbs Act 
is widely used to prosecute public officials for extortion.50 
Two decades after Kenny, in Evans v. United States,51 the Supreme 
Court held that the Hobbs Act also applied to public officials who did 
                                                                                                                     
Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049–50 (1983) (discussing the purpose and 
legislative history of the Hobbs Act); Harary, supra note 37, at 1341–46 (discussing the history 
of the Hobbs Act in relation to the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1970) (prosecuting a 
union president for threatening to stop construction projects unless he was paid a bribe); United 
States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 288–89 (2d Cir. 1962) (prosecuting a union agent for receiving 
bribes to prevent a labor dispute); United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 493–95 (2d Cir. 
1958) (prosecuting a union business agent who threatened to call a strike unless bribes were 
paid); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 443–45 (8th Cir. 1954) (prosecuting a labor 
representative who threatened labor unrest unless tribute was paid). 
 43. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 44. Id. at 1229. 
 45. Id. at 1211. 
 46. Id. at 1210. 
 47. Id. at 1229–30. 
 48. Id. at 1229 (reasoning that “while private persons may violate the statute only by use 
of fear . . . persons holding public office may also violate the statute by a wrongful taking under 
color of official right”). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Swift, 732 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124–25 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 457 (7th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 302–07 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 371–72 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d 
Cir. 1975); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 644–45 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Price, 507 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1974). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
not addressed this issue because prosecutions of public officials in the District of Columbia, like 
prosecutions of federal officials, fall under the federal bribery statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 
(2012). 
 50. Garcia, supra note 12, at 230.  
 51. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
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not induce the bribery.52 In Evans, the petitioner was a commissioner 
convicted of accepting a bribe in exchange for agreeing to rezone a 
piece of land for a project.53 The petitioner argued that he was 
improperly convicted for extortion “under color of official right” under 
the Hobbs Act because he never induced the bribe.54 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and held that a public official does not 
need to induce the bribe under the Hobbs Act’s definition of extortion—
merely receiving a bribe while in office is sufficient.55 Accordingly, 
after Evans, the Hobbs Act has been one of prosecutors’ favorite tools 
in public corruption cases.56 
 
II.  PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE: WHY PUNISH CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICE AS SEVERELY AS CURRENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
 
The U.S. Department of Justice views federal election crimes as a 
“high law enforcement priority.”57 As Justice Clarence Thomas stated in 
his dissent in Evans, “[p]olitical corruption at any level of government 
is a serious evil.”58 Due to their influence, public officials have a special 
position in society and are the focus of powerful lobbyists.59 Corrupt 
public officials hurt democracy at its core, and corruption by public 
officials creates diffuse negative social consequences that may cause 
substantial harm to society.60 Public official corruption undermines the 
legitimacy of the government and the entire political system.61 Public 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 265 (“[The Hobbs Act] merely requires of the public official that he obtain 
‘property from another, with his consent, . . . under color of official right.’ The use of the word 
‘or’ before ‘under color of official right’ supports this reading.” (second alteration in original) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 53. Id. at 257. 
 54. Id. at 257–58. 
 55. Id. at 268. 
 56. See Garcia, supra note 12, at 230, 233 n.30. 
 57. CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION 
OFFENSES 10 (7th ed. 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/electbook-
0507.pdf. 
 58. Evans, 504 U.S. at 295 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 59. For example, in United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 693 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized the unique position that public 
officials have in society because of the influence and power they wield and the attention they 
receive from lobbyists. 
 60. See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1815, 1830–32 (2011) (describing the harm of corruption on society); see, e.g., Kim, supra 
note 9, at 901 (“[E]mpirical work has found high levels of corruption to be associated with 
underinvestment in education.”). 
 61. FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: HOW 
CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE, at xiii (1996). 
9
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official corruption also threatens national security and touches all U.S. 
citizens.62 Additionally, public official corruption is the direct cause of 
billions of dollars of waste every year.63 Therefore, society correctly 
expects corrupt public officials to be severely reprimanded. Society thus 
needs an appropriate enforcement response to regulate public integrity 
and prevent such damaging corruption.64 
A.  Alternatives to the Hobbs Act 
Since the 1970s, the Hobbs Act has proven to be an efficient tool to 
combat public official corruption65 and is frequently used to prosecute 
public officials for corrupt acts.66 In 1974, 213 public officials were 
successfully prosecuted under the Hobbs Act.67 In 1977, this number 
more than doubled.68 And in 2012, the number of public officials 
successfully prosecuted under the Hobbs Act increased to 1060.69 The 
spectrum of public officials convicted is broad, ranging from a city 
electrical inspector to a governor.70 And public officials have been 
convicted of extortion for having received various forms of property, 
ranging from cash payments to golf vacations.71 
Congress has attempted to pass legislation to address issues 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Public Corruption, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/corruption (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (“Public corruption poses a fundamental 
threat to our national security and way of life.”). 
 63. Id. (stating that corruption “takes a significant toll on our pocketbooks, wasting 
billions in tax dollars every year”). 
 64. Griffin, supra note 60, at 1816. 
 65. See Garcia, supra note 12, at 233; cf. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (“[P]ersons holding public office may also violate the [Hobbs Act] by a wrongful 
taking under color of official right.”). 
 66. Gayed, supra note 9, at 1732; CRIM. RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-131.00, at 2404, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9crm02404.htm 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 67. Gawey, supra note 23, at 399–400. 
 68. Id. at 400. 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF 
THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2012, at 24 tbl.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2012-Annual-Report.pdf. The U.S. Department of 
Justice reported that 369 federal officials, 78 state officials, 295 local officials, and 318 others 
were successfully prosecuted under the Hobbs Act in 2012. Id. 
 70. James P. Fleissner, Comment, Prosecuting Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: 
Inducement as an Element of Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066, 
1066 n.2 (1985) (citing United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 456 (7th Cir. 1979) (city electrical 
inspector) and United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 316 (10th Cir. 1976) (governor)). 
 71. Id. at 1066 & n.3 (citing United States v. Campo, 744 F.2d 944, 945 (2d Cir. 1984) 
($250 cash payment); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1097–98 (2d Cir. 1975) ($3000 
campaign contribution); United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 697 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (en 
banc) (golf vacations and entertainment)). 
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associated with corrupt political campaign funds and corrupt candidates 
for public office.72 Candidates for public office have a right to receive 
campaign funds, if appropriately declared, from businesses and 
individuals who expect to influence the candidates’ conduct once in 
office.73 But 18 U.S.C. § 599 makes it a crime for candidates, regardless 
of their incumbency, running for public office to solicit, extort, or 
receive bribes in the form of campaign contributions in return for 
supporting a person for public or private employment.74 The statute 
establishes that candidates for public office may receive up to two-years 
imprisonment, a fine, or both if they willfully solicit a bribe in 
conjunction with their candidacy.75 Section 599 provides that: 
Whoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly promises 
or pledges the appointment, or the use of his influence or 
support for the appointment of any person to any public or 
private position or employment, for the purpose of 
procuring support in his candidacy shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if 
the violation was willful, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.76 
The existence of § 599 does not suggest that extortion by a candidate 
for public office should not be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. 
According to the legislative history, Congress’s main intention when 
passing 18 U.S.C. § 599 was to reduce the corrupt practice among 
candidates for public office who were auctioning office appointments in 
exchange for money during their political campaign.77 The existence of 
§ 599 could be interpreted as a sign that Congress has thought about the 
criminality of corruption by candidates for public office.  
Additionally, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) governs 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (2012)). For further discussion of laws 
that promote government transparency and discourage corruption see Karl Gruss, Note, 
Freedom of Information Act and Federal Licensing Procedures: Invoking Exemption 7(F) to 
Protect Examination Materials, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1403, 1414–15 (2014). 
 73. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2012); 
Gayed, supra note 9, at 1731. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 599. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Mitu Gulati, “Mr. Presidential Candidate: Whom Would 
You Nominate?,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 293, 317 (2009) (“Beyond these textual considerations, 
the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 599 reveals that Congress targeted corruption in the form 
of candidates secretly auctioning government appointments in return for money and political 
patronage from corrupt interests.”). 
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contributions and expenditures made to both political committees and 
candidates for federal offices.78 Congress passed FECA in response to 
the public’s increasing concern over growing political corruption.79 
FECA provides a comprehensive framework of campaign finance 
regulations by specifically establishing limits for contributions and 
expenditures.80 It prohibits, for instance, personal use of contributions.81 
Misdemeanor violations of FECA by a candidate for office are 
punishable by a fine, imprisonment for no more than one year, or both, 
while felony violations are punishable by a fine, imprisonment for no 
more than five years, or both.82 
In comparison to the Hobbs Act, which provides up to twenty years 
of imprisonment for extortion “under color of official right,”83 
18 U.S.C. § 599 and FECA are weak. The disparities between 
punishments for elected officials and non-incumbent candidates running 
for public office do not reflect the views of society, which do not 
distinguish between a corrupt unelected candidate and a corrupt elected 
public official. If the Hobbs Act does not apply to non-incumbent 
candidates for public office who receive a bribe in exchange for 
promised behavior once elected, severe inconsistencies will indeed arise 
under the law. While current public officials promising future conduct 
may be severely reprimanded and imprisoned under the Hobbs Act for 
up to twenty years,84 non-incumbent candidates making the same 
promises would not receive the same punishment. A public official 
currently in office may be imprisoned for twenty years under the Hobbs 
Act,85 while a candidate may be imprisoned for only two years under 18 
U.S.C. § 599.86 This is noticeably inconsistent, particularly for a crime 
whose eradication is a high level priority for government agencies.87 
Further, “[j]ust enforcement of the criminal laws requires a high degree 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 79. See Jessica Furst, Note, Money and Politics: Will Expenditure Limits Take Candidates 
Out of the Money Race and Put Them Back in the Office?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 873, 876 (2007) 
(noting that Congress was “[a]ware that the increasingly tight bond between money and politics 
presented ample opportunity for corruption, at least in the public’s perception,” and that as a 
result, this awareness “culminated in the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971”). 
 80. Id. at 876–77. 
 81. 2 U.S.C. § 439a(b)(1). 
 82. Id. § 437g(d)(1)(A). 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. § 599. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 57–64. 
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of consistency.”88 A possible solution to this apparent structural flaw is 
to read the prohibitions of the Hobbs Act as including the corrupt 
behavior of candidates for public office receiving bribes in exchange for 
future promises to act once elected. 
B.  Examples of Inconsistent Cases 
When candidates for public office who accept a bribe in return for a 
promise of future action are not included within the scope of “under 
color of official right,” inconsistent cases arise. Comparing McCormick 
v. United States89 to United States v. Manzo90 illustrates this principle. 
In McCormick, Robert McCormick was a member of the West Virginia 
House of Delegates when he received bribes from a lobbyist.91 In the 
early 1980s, West Virginia was experiencing a shortage of licensed 
medical doctors.92 In response, the state legislature created a program to 
allow medical students to receive temporary licenses to practice while 
the students studied for the state licensing exam.93 When some of 
temporary license holders repeatedly failed to pass their licensing 
exams, the legislature considered reforming this program.94 
Consequently, a group of temporary license holders formed a political 
interest group and hired a lobbyist in order to retain the temporary 
license program.95 The lobbyist contacted McCormick, who agreed to 
sponsor the bill to continue the temporary license program.96 
McCormick sponsored the House version of the proposed legislation, 
and a bill was passed extending the program for another year.97 Shortly 
thereafter, McCormick also agreed to sponsor legislation during the 
1985 legislative session that would grant the doctors a permanent 
medical license by virtue of their years of experience.98 When 
McCormick ran for reelection in 1984, he advised the lobbyist of his 
“expensive” campaign and urged the lobbyist to contact the political 
interest group of temporary license holders.99 Consequently, 
McCormick received several cash payments from the political interest 
group in exchange for a promise to continue to support the temporary 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Griffin, supra note 60, at 1846. 
 89. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 90. 636 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 91. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 259–60. 
 92. Id. at 259. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 259–60. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 260.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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license program once reelected.100 But he never listed those 
contributions on his tax return.101 As a result, McCormick was 
prosecuted under the Hobbs Act.102  
In McCormick, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if the payments are 
made “for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform 
or not to perform an official act,” then the extortion is “under color of 
official right” under the Hobbs Act.103 Because McCormick was still in 
office when he received the money in exchange for a promise of action 
once he was reelected, the Supreme Court held that McCormick could 
be convicted under the Hobbs Act for having received the bribes, even 
though the bribes were contingent on his reelection.104  
On the other hand, the defendant in Manzo was not convicted under 
the Hobbs Act.105 In Manzo, the defendant, Louis Manzo, was an 
unsuccessful candidate, who also received a bribe in exchange for his 
express promise to perform specific acts once in public office.106 Manzo 
was running for mayor of Jersey City.107 During his campaign, Manzo 
agreed to receive cash payments from Solomon Dwek, who was posing 
as a real estate developer.108 In exchange, Manzo promised that, if 
elected, he would help Dwek with matters involving the city’s 
government.109 Manzo received part of the bribe during his mayoral 
campaign and was promised the other part of the bribe once in office.110 
In Manzo, the Third Circuit focused its analysis on the meaning of 
acting “under color of official right” and whether a candidate fell into 
this classification.111 The court concluded that “[c]onduct by an 
unsuccessful candidate in an election does not meet th[e] [Hobbs Act] 
requirement[s].”112 
The results of McCormick and Manzo illustrate that a distinction 
between candidates and elected public officials under the Hobbs Act 
produces arbitrary results. In McCormick, the defendant was a current 
public official,113 while the defendant in Manzo had not yet been elected 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 261. 
 103. Id. at 273. 
 104. Id. 
105. 636 F.3d 56, 69 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 106. Id. at 59.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 59–60. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 65. 
 112. Id. at 69.  
 113. McCormick, 500 U.S. 257, 259 (1991). 
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to public office. The defendants in the two cases acted similarly, 
however, the defendant in McCormick was running for reelection, and 
thus held the office at the time that he received the bribe for a promise 
to act when reelected.114  
This inconsistency between the results of McCormick and Manzo is 
contrary to society’s goal to deter public corruption.115 Manzo’s loss of 
an election had nothing to do with his crime of accepting a bribe and 
agreeing to act on the payer’s behalf once in office. While the bribe 
might not have been efficient because a losing candidate cannot fulfill 
his promise to the bribing party, society still has an interest in punishing 
and deterring candidates from accepting bribes. Additionally, corruption 
cases tend to focus on a public official’s criminal intent when taking a 
bribe, rather than whether the public official actually acted.116 
Therefore, because public policy dictates that society should strongly 
punish public officials who have criminal intent, and because such 
crime threatens social order,117 candidates for public office should be 
prosecutable under an efficient prosecutorial tool. The Hobbs Act can 
offer this efficiency. 
III.  THE HOBBS ACT GOVERNS THE INCHOATE CRIME OF 
EXTORTION  
Candidates for public office receiving money in exchange for future 
acts are, at minimum, attempting or conspiring to extort money “under 
color of official right,” which is explicitly prosecutable under the Hobbs 
Act. Indeed, punishing candidates for inchoate crimes, such as 
attempting or conspiring to extort money “under color of official right,” 
is consistent with how courts have generally interpreted the Hobbs Act.  
Indeed, the question of whether a non-incumbent candidate for office 
who wins an election be charged for violation of the Hobbs Act is not 
new. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
encountered the question in United States v. Meyers.118 The court held 
that a non-incumbent candidate could be charged under the Hobbs Act 
when he accepted a bribe during his campaign in return for a promise 
for future action once elected, and started to perform his promise once 
in office.119 In Meyers, the court reasoned that the person paying the 
bribe to the candidate could have reasonably believed that the candidate 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 259–60. 
 115. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Hardy, supra note 16, at 456. 
 117. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.  
 118. 529 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 119. Id. 
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would be elected.120 Therefore, the court broadened the Hobbs Act’s 
application by charging a public official for his conduct as a non-
incumbent candidate for public office.121 The court determined that the 
most relevant part of its analysis is whether the briber believed that the 
candidate would be elected and able to perform his promise, and not 
whether the candidate was actually in office at the time of the 
promise.122 The court also reasoned that “it is no less of a crime under 
the Hobbs Act to sell one’s public trust before, rather than after, one is 
installed in public office.”123 Nevertheless, the Meyers court did not 
discuss whether a candidate for public office who subsequently lost the 
election would be included under this reasoning.124 
A.  An Explicit Inclusion of the Inchoate Crime of Extortion 
The Hobbs Act prohibits actual and attempted extortion, as well as 
conspiracy to commit extortion by public officials.125 Both attempt and 
conspiracy are inchoate crimes126 that are prosecutable even though they 
may not be completed.127 Conspiracy occurs when an alleged criminal 
promises to act in an unlawful manner and actually acts in a way that 
shows that he will attempt to accomplish the act.128 The Third Circuit, 
in United States v. Jannotti,129 correctly reasoned that “[t]he ultimate 
failure of conspiracy may diminish, but does not eliminate, the threat it 
poses to social order; therefore, the illegality of the agreement does not 
depend on the achievement of its ends.”130 Likewise, a candidate for 
public office receiving a bribe threatens social order. Accepting a bribe 
in return for a promise of future action once in office is equivalent to 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 1038. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 1035–36.  
 125. 18 U.S.C § 1951(a) (2012). 
 126. Black’s Law Dictionary lists “attempt” and “conspiracy” as inchoate crimes and states 
that “inchoate . . . means just begun, undeveloped.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (9th ed. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] principal feature of these crimes is that 
they are committed even though the substantive offence is not successfully consummated.” Id.  
 127. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008) (reasoning that 
“impossibility of completing the crime because the facts were not as the defendant believed is 
not a defense” to an inchoate crime such as attempt or conspiracy). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(“Conspiracy . . . is an agreement plus an overt act, and the possibility of success has never been 
thought to be of its essence.”); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The 
offense of conspiracy is complete when the criminal agreement has been entered into and at 
least one overt act has been performed in furtherance thereof.”). 
 129. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 130. Id. at 591. 
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attempting or conspiring to commit extortion “under color of official 
right.” 
A candidate for public office hopes to be elected, but getting enough 
votes to be elected is beyond the candidate’s control. Further, factual 
impossibility is not a defense to inchoate crimes.131 Factual 
impossibility occurs when a defendant faces extraneous 
circumstances—unknown to him or beyond his control—that render 
impossible his successful completion of the crime.132 Thus, 
impossibility in getting elected should not be a defense to the crime of 
conspiring to extort “under color of official right.” 
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with applying this approach 
in Manzo, where the court reasoned that a losing candidate could not be 
prosecuted under the Hobbs Act for a bribe he received before winning 
office.133 The Third Circuit’s reasoning in Manzo overlooked the most 
important part of the conspiracy analysis: Because Manzo had received 
part of the bribe and had made the promise to act in a corrupt manner 
once in office, Manzo had already committed the crime of conspiracy to 
commit extortion “under color of official right.” Because inchoate 
crimes do not have to be completed to be prosecutable, the court should 
have focused on whether Manzo had attempted or conspired to get a 
payment “under color of official right,” and not whether Manzo was 
already in office while conspiring or even capable of completing his 
intended crime.134 
In its brief, the government properly contrasted the situation in 
Manzo with the facts of United States v. Ledesma–Cuesta.135 In 
Ledesma–Cuesta, the defendant possessed cocaine on board a vessel 
going to the United States, but the drugs were discovered before the 
defendant entered U.S. waters.136 An essential element of the offense, 
however, was that the defendant had to be “subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States.”137 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit correctly held that 
the government could charge the defendant with an attempt to sell 
cocaine in the United States before the defendant actually reached U.S. 
territory.138 The court reasoned that when the defendant was arrested, he 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Williams, 553 U.S. at 300; see also Hobbs Act May Prohibit a Conspiracy by 
Candidates for Public Office, United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976), 1977 
WASH. U. L. Q. 326, 331 [hereinafter Hobbs Act May Prohibit a Conspiracy]. 
 132. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 133. United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 59, 69 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 134. See Brief for Petitioner at 13–14, United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-2489). 
 135. Id. at 20–21; United States v. Ledesma–Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 136. Ledesma–Cuesta, 347 F.3d at 527–28. 
 137. Id. at 530–32. 
 138. Id. at 532. 
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had already taken sufficient steps to accomplish the drug possession 
crime, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”139  
In Manzo, the government argued that the Third Circuit should take 
a similar approach.140 As in Ledesma–Cuesta, the defendant in Manzo 
could not fully accomplish the act he was charged with. Indeed, the 
defendant in Manzo was not yet an elected public official, he was only a 
candidate, and thus may not have fully accomplished one of the Hobbs 
Act’s elements, acting “under color of official right.” Even if the Hobbs 
Act’s “under color of official right” extortion requires an alleged 
offender to be a current public official, this does not change the fact 
that, similar to the defendant in Ledesma–Cuesta, the defendant in 
Manzo took substantial steps to accomplish that element of the offense. 
Manzo was running for office, was in the middle of a political 
campaign, and had already received part of the bribe. At a minimum, 
Manzo either attempted or conspired to extort money “under color of 
official right” and, therefore, should have been prosecutable under the 
Hobbs Act. 
B.  An Overview of Existing Cases 
Punishing political candidates for attempting or conspiring to extort 
money “under color of official right” is consistent with how courts have 
generally interpreted the Hobbs Act. While the Hobbs Act’s use of the 
phrase “under color of official right” presupposes a public trust position, 
as long as the briber had a reasonable belief that the public official 
would be able to act in a certain way once elected, the official does not 
need to have the actual authority to perform his promise.141 Violators of 
the Hobbs Act acting “under color of official right” do not need to have 
final authority, control, or actual power to carry out their promise.142 
Even though the violator lacked the de jure power to carry out the 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 531–32. 
 140. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 20–21. 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Wingo, 723 F. Supp. 798, 804 (N.D. Ga. 1989) 
(“[A]lthough extortion under color of official right presupposes some public trust position, the 
public official need not actually have the authority that he allegedly misused. This element is 
satisfied if the defendant exploited a victim’s reasonable belief that the official had such power.” 
(citing United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir.1975) (en banc))); United States v. 
Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the district court properly 
stated the law when it instructed the jury that a person may be convicted of bribery even if the 
person does not have official power to perform). 
 142. United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1032 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that “contrary to 
Defendant’s position, it is not necessary that the public official have final authority or control”); 
Id. (“[T]he Hobbs Act reaches those public employees who may lack the actual power to bring 
about official action, but create the reasonable impression that they do possess such power.”); 
see also United States v. Gonzales, 620 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
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promise, the briber’s belief in the de facto power of the violator is 
sufficient to allow for prosecution of the violator.143 Additionally, the 
briber does not even have to be aware of the title or position of the so-
called public official.144  
In United States v. Mazzei, the Third Circuit upheld the conviction of 
Senator Paul Mazzei for extortion “under color of official right” even 
though Mazzei had no actual power to achieve what he had promised.145 
Senator Mazzei received a bribe from the owner of a building in 
exchange for a promise that the government would lease space in the 
owner’s building.146 Consequently, Senator Mazzei was charged with 
extortion “under color of official right” under the Hobbs Act.147 
Because it is well known that legislators do not have the actual power to 
lease space from a building on behalf of the government, Senator 
Mazzei argued he had not acted “under color of official right.”148 The 
Third Circuit disagreed and held that if the briber reasonably believed 
that the violator had the actual power to fulfill his promise, then an act 
of extortion “under color of official right” was committed under the 
Hobbs Act.149 
This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent 
reasoning in Evans v. United States.150 In Evans, the Court reasoned that 
once a public official has unlawfully accepted a bribe in return for a 
requested service, no additional inducement is needed for a Hobbs Act 
extortion conviction.151 The Court reasoned that the public official’s 
“acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit promise to use his 
official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver.”152 Under the 
Hobbs Act definitions of extortion, the violator’s actual power to 
perform the promise is irrelevant.153 Similarly, the actual power of a 
candidate receiving a bride to perform once elected is irrelevant, as long 
as the briber reasonably believed that the candidate would be elected. 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 650 (“‘[I]t appears that a de facto as well as a de jure officer is 
punishable for extortion, as he is for any other malfeasance in office.’” (quoting Kitby v. State, 
31 A. 213, 213 (N.J. 1894))). 
 144. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1382 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that “the 
victim need not actually know the official’s position; it is enough that the victim reasonably 
believe the official can do what he threatens”). 
 145. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 643. 
 146. Id. at 641. 
 147. Id. at 640. 
 148. See id. at 643–44. 
 149. Id. at 645. 
 150. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 151. Id. at 259. 
 152. Id. at 257. 
 153. Id. at 268.  
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Thus, there is no reason why a corrupt candidate could not be charged 
with attempt or conspiracy to extort under the Hobbs Act. The candidate 
has already taken substantial steps towards extortion “under color of 
official right”: he has received an unlawful bribe in exchange for a 
promise to act corruptly once elected. 
C.  Consistency with Federal Bribery Statutes 
Congress has also criminalized the act of giving a bribe to a public 
official.154 Both the public official receiving the bribe and the person 
offering the bribe commit the crime of bribery.155 In fact, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201 makes it a crime to bribe public officials and witnesses alike.156 
Similar to the Hobbs Act, the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 201 is to protect 
the public by discouraging or “preventing the corruption of a federal 
official.”157 Similar to the Hobbs Act, the corrupt public official’s actual 
power to perform the requested act is irrelevant to the crime of bribery 
under 18 U.S.C. § 201.158 The crime of bribery is complete when the 
bribe is accepted, regardless of whether the recipient actually performs 
the promised act.159 As long as the public official accepts the bribe and 
the briber intends for the bribe to influence the public official’s 
decisions, the offense of attempted bribery is complete.160  
Similarly, a violator of the Hobbs Act does not need to have the 
actual power to perform his promise once he receives a bribe.161 
Accordingly, under the Hobbs Act, a losing candidate for public office 
should be prosecutable for attempt or conspiracy to extort. If someone 
gives a bribe to a candidate in exchange for a promise to act once 
elected, the briber reasonably believes that the public official can or will 
                                                                                                                     
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 155. See id.; Gawey, supra note 23, at 395. 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 157. United States v. Gjieli, 717 F.2d 968, 972 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Kemler v. United 
States, 133 F.2d 235, 238 (1st Cir. 1942)); Kemler, 133 F.2d at 237–38 (discussing the former 
version of 18 U.S.C. § 201 and stating the “clear purpose of the statute is to protect the public 
from the evil consequences of corruption in the public service”). 
 158. See Gjieli, 717 F.2d at 973 (noting that “the Second, Seventh, Fourth, Fifth and 
District of Columbia Circuits . . . have all imposed § 201 liability on bribers who erroneously 
perceived that the duties of a public official would give that official the authority to accomplish 
the desired act”). 
 159. See Howard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 1965). 
 160. See id. at 128; see also United States v. Troop, 235 F.2d 123, 124–25 (7th Cir. 1956) 
(“We hold the offense of attempted bribery of a Federal Officer is complete upon the tender of 
the bribe to such Officer with intent to influence his decisions and acts in an official capacity. 
We think it is entirely immaterial that for some reason, subsequently determined, the Officer 
could not have brought about the result desired by the person offering the bribe. We think the 
authorities are in accord.”). 
 161. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
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act once in office. Likewise, the candidate intends and hopes to be 
elected. As the court stated in Howard v. United States, “[o]bviously no 
one would give or offer a bribe unless he expected to gain some 
advantage thereby, and since attempting to gain an advantage by this 
means is the evil which the statute is designed to prevent,” it does not 
make any difference whether the act for which the bribe is given is 
actually done or even whether the act could be done.162 
Courts agree that 18 U.S.C. § 201 should be interpreted broadly.163 
The courts should also interpret the Hobbs Act broadly enough to make 
candidates for public office who receive a bribe in exchange for 
promised behavior once elected prosecutable for at least attempt or 
conspiracy to commit extortion “under color of official right.”  
IV.  A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF “UNDER COLOR OF 
OFFICIAL RIGHT”: THE NEED TO INCLUDE CANDIDATES FOR 
PUBLIC OFFICE 
The words “under color of official right” are ambiguous. Courts 
have historically grappled with the meaning of this clause and the 
debate over its interpretation is ongoing.164 As Justice Anthony 
Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in Evans, “the phrase, ‘under 
color of official right,’ standing alone, is vague almost to the point of 
unconstitutionality.”165 The language certainly does not foreclose the 
prosecution of candidates for public office under the Hobbs Act when 
they receive a bribe in exchange for a promise to act once elected.166 
Neither the legislative history of the Hobbs Act nor of its predecessor 
the Anti-Racketeering Act illuminates the meaning or interpretation of 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See Howard, 345 F.2d at 129 (quoting Kemler, 133 F.2d at 238). 
 163. See, e.g., Parks v. United States, 355 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1965) (“This Court has 
approved the cases from those circuits which have given a broad construction to this statute.”); 
Wilson v. United States, 230 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1956) (reasoning that “in the face of such 
sweeping language and the purpose it was designed to accomplish, we find no reason to find any 
intent on the part of Congress that the statute must be narrowly construed, to exclude any person 
or any conduct fairly within the broad statutory ambit”); Hurley v. United States, 192 F.2d 297, 
300 (4th Cir. 1951) (“The term ‘person acting for the United States in an official function’ is 
broad enough to include officers and employees.”). 
 164. United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Evans v. United 
States, 504 U.S. 255, 264–66 (1992) (noting disagreement among courts over terms in the 
Hobbs Act).  
 165. Evans, 504 U.S. at 275 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 
O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 695 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 166. See 18 U.S.C § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (“The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”). 
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“under color of official right.”167 Congress passed the Hobbs Act to 
reduce corrupt activities in government.168 Congress may have 
purposely made the Hobbs Act broad to permit it to evolve over time. 
So, does “under color of official right” include candidates for public 
office receiving bribes in exchange for a promise to perform once in 
office? 
The Third Circuit in Manzo, in analyzing whether “under color of 
official right” includes candidates for public office, first addressed the 
plain meaning of the words.169 Due to the inherent ambiguity of “under 
color of official right,” the court was unable to use a plain meaning 
approach.170 The court then considered the legislative history to 
determine Congress’s intended meaning of the clause.171 Because the 
legislature did not discuss the meaning directly, this too proved 
unsatisfactory.172  
The Manzo court proceeded to use common law sources to explain 
the original meaning of “under color of official right.”173 While this 
approach is common,174 the court misapplied it in the Manzo ruling. 
First, while it is true that according to some older common law theories 
“under color of official right” did not include candidates for public 
office,175 this narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the reality that 
government is more concerned than ever about corruption.176 Thus, it is 
difficult to argue that Congress would not want the Hobbs Act, widely 
used to combat public corruption, to apply in cases where candidates for 
office receive bribes in exchange for promises to perform once in 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Harary, supra note 37, at 1346. 
 168. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,899–922 (1945); H.R.REP. NO. 73-1833, at 2 (1934) (including 
a letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings to the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee stating “the purpose of the legislation is . . . to set up severe penalties for 
racketeering by violence, extortion, or coercion”); see also Harary, supra note 37, at 1347 & 
n.38 (1985) (“[T]he only significant mention during the House debates of the ‘color of official 
right’ langnage [sic] was an amendment offered by Representative Day to expunge it. The 
amendment was voted down after Representative Hobbs, the bill’s sponsor, explained that this 
language would not apply to a union official trying to collect initiation fees or dues in a labor 
union.” (citation omitted) (citing 89 CONG. REC. 3228–29 (1943))). 
 169. Manzo, 636 F.3d at 61. 
 170. Id. at 62. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 63. 
 173. Id. at 64–65. 
 174. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992); id. at 260, 263 (discussing 
the common law definition of extortion when interpreting the Hobbs Act). 
 175. See id. at 260; United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 650 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 176. See Garcia, supra note 12, at 234 (describing how the Hobbs Act was rarely used to 
prosecute public officials committing extortion until the 1970s). 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/7
2015] BOUNCING THE PROVERBIAL BLANK CHECK 385 
 
office.177 
Second, the Manzo court improperly concluded that because 
Congress had the opportunity to use different language when it created 
the Hobbs Act, and since it did not, the “under color of official right” 
language was to be given its common law meaning.178 Congress passed 
the Hobbs Act to replace the Anti-Racketeering Act,179 and since 1946 
courts have interpreted many provisions of the Hobbs Act contrary to 
the common law. At least partially due to court interpretations, statutory 
extortion is currently far different from common law extortion. For 
instance, contrary to common law extortion, courts have interpreted the 
Hobbs Act to not require a corrupt state of mind.180 Additionally, 
Congress never expressly commented on the use of the Hobbs Act as a 
weapon against political corruption,181 and yet, since the 1970s, the 
Hobbs Act is one of the leading prosecutorial tools against political 
corruption.182 In light of Congress’s silence on the issue, and in light of 
the evolution of the Hobbs Act throughout the years, a better analysis of 
“under color of official right” would consider societies’ modern view on 
the issue of public official corruption. Because courts have focused on 
criminal intent when accepting a bribe rather than a violator’s actual 
power to fulfill a promise,183 a candidate for public office should be 
considered capable of acting “under color of official right” regardless of 
the outcome of an election.  
Third, Congress may have purposely left the language of the Hobbs 
Act vague for courts to properly interpret the Act in accordance with 
modern society’s views on the issue of political corruption. It is well 
established that Congress sometimes defers statutory interpretation to 
courts,184 particularly because inflexible legislation may become 
quickly outdated.185 Courts often clarify the scope of legislation and 
elaborate on the legislative intent behind criminal statutes.186 Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the Hobbs Act was “to prevent interference with 
                                                                                                                     
 177. However, judicial activism might be preferred here since Congress is comprised of 
elected public officials who might be less likely to pass public official anti-corruption measures.  
 178. See Manzo, 636 F.3d at 63. 
 179. See id.  
 180. See, e.g., Evans, 504 U.S. at 270. 
 181. See supra Section I.B. 
 182. See Garcia, supra note 12, at 233 & n.30. 
 183. See supra Part III. 
 184. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 
347. 
 185. Griffin, supra note 60, at 1828. 
 186. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 471 (1996). 
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interstate commerce by robbery or extortion.”187 Such a broad purpose 
is consistent with Congress’s intent to pass broad anti-corruption 
legislation and to leave room for courts to interpret the Hobbs Act. 
Additionally, courts have already given a broad interpretation to 
Congress’s intent under the Hobbs Act.188 
As the Seventh Circuit stated, “[t]he use of office to obtain payments 
is the crux of the statutory requirement of ‘under color of official 
right.’”189 Thus, the relevant analysis is whether the candidate for public 
office used the pretext of office to receive a bribe and not whether the 
candidate was actually in office when receiving the bribe. A candidate 
for public office extorting money for the promise to act once elected has 
committed the crux of the statutory requirement of extortion “under 
color of official right.” And contrary to the Third Circuit’s opinion in 
Manzo, a candidate for public office extorting money for promises to 
act if elected is indeed committing extortion “under color of official 
right.” 
Courts have used similar reasoning in Civil Rights Act cases based 
on the analysis of the “crux” of the statutory requirement. In United 
States v. Price,190 the defendants were charged with conspiracy to injure 
and punish three persons in custody in county jail without due 
process.191 Among the defendants were state officials as well as non-
official defendants.192 The question arose as to whether the non-official 
defendants could be acting “under color of law” in participating in the 
conspiracy due to their cooperation with the state officials.193 The 
Supreme Court held that both public officials and private citizens who 
engaged with a public official in a prohibited civil rights crime could be 
punished under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.194 That is, a private citizen 
can act “under color of law” without being an officer of the state if the 
private citizen willfully participated in a crime with the state or its 
agents,195 because “they were participants in official lawlessness.”196  
In United States v. Lester,197 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit also upheld the conviction of a private citizen for extortion 
                                                                                                                     
 187. H.R. REP. NO. 79-238, at 1 (1945). 
 188. See Hobbs Act May Prohibit a Conspiracy, supra note 131, at 334. 
 189. United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).  
 190. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
 191. Id. at 789–90.  
 192. Id at 790–91.  
 193. Id. at 791–93.  
 194. Id. at 794. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 795.  
 197. 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966).  
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.198 The defendant in that case was 
charged with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 242—addressing the 
deprivation of rights under color of law—for arresting and imprisoning 
the victim without due process.199 The defendant argued that, as a 
private citizen, he was incapable of acting “under color of law” and thus 
could not be prosecuted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.200 The Sixth 
Circuit disagreed and held that the defendant could be convicted for 
extortion “under color of law,” even though the defendant was not a 
public official and the defendant’s alleged accomplices—the public 
officials—were not convicted.201 The Sixth Circuit reasoned, inter alia, 
that the “‘willfulness’ [of committing the criminal act] may reside in a 
person wholly incapable of committing the forbidden act.”202  
 Therefore, under the Hobbs Act, a candidate for public office may 
acquire official status by proximity to public office alone.203 This is 
because“[t]he aura of officialdom is expansive enough to engulf those 
who acquire officiality by association.”204 Thus, “under color of official 
right” may also be interpreted to include private citizens who do not 
have de jure public official power, but are sufficiently associated with 
public office to be attributed the official status required by the Hobbs 
Act. Because a briber would not waste his money on someone he 
believes has no chance of winning an election, a private citizen running 
for office who receives a bribe in exchange for a promise to act once 
elected is sufficiently close to public office. 
Courts may have concerns with promoting a broader interpretation 
of the Hobbs Act. They may fear making valuable political activity—
political campaign contributions—a crime.205 But under the Hobbs Act, 
the objects of scrutiny should be public officials and non-incumbent 
candidates unlawfully extorting money from private citizens. Such 
behavior, by either classification, has no positive value for society. 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 74.  
 199. Id. at 69.  
 200. Id. at 72.  
 201. Id. at 73–74.  
 202. Id. at 73.  
 203. See Hobbs Act May Prohibit a Conspiracy, supra note 131, at 328 n.16 (noting that 
because in certain instances private persons are able to commit extortion “under color of law” 
this may suggest that “under color of official right” may not be a rigid standard limited to 
actions of de jure public officials); see also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) 
(noting that private citizens can act “under color” of law when that private citizen is a joint 
participant in unlawful activity and engaged by public officials); Lester, 363 F.2d 68 at 73–74 
(1967) (upholding the conviction of a private citizen who conspired with police officers to 
falsely arrest someone).  
 204. Hobbs Act May Prohibit a Conspiracy, supra note 131, at 328 n.16. 
 205. See Hardy, supra note 16, at 412–13.  
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Because corruption should have no place in a democratic society, 
bribery should not be referred to as a political activity. Bribery is 
different than legal political contributions: It hurts democracy at its 
core.206 Additional anti-corruption regulation would not deter 
candidates for public office from seeking political contributions in 
traditional settings without the use of extortion or bribery.207 Therefore, 
society would benefit from harsher sentences to deter political 
corruption, and courts should not fear imposing appropriate sanctions 
on corrupt public officeholders or non-incumbent candidates running 
for public office. 
CONCLUSION 
All elected public officials were once candidates for office. The 
importance of combating corruption among candidates is thus as 
important as combating corruption among current public officials. The 
Hobbs Act is a powerful tool to combat political corruption. Candidates 
for public office who receive a bribe in exchange for a promise to act 
once elected have shown precisely the corrupt intent that society seeks 
to expunge and prevent. Such candidates have accepted a bribe before 
ever setting foot in office, thus already tainting the faith society has 
placed in them as elected officials. Refusing to punish non-incumbent 
candidates at the same level as current public officials is inconsistent 
with the broader goal of preventing all political corruption.  
Society views corruption as a serious political evil, and courts have an 
opportunity to respond to this growing concern among citizens. The 
criminal justice system would be well served if Congress reformed and 
harmonized anti-corruption laws. But until Congress acts to resolve these 
inconsistencies, courts should stop bouncing the proverbial blank check 
and interpret the Hobbs Act to reconcile this disharmony and make the 
Hobbs Act the flexible anti-corruption weapon that prosecutors need. 
Courts should include candidates for public office in the meaning of 
“under color of official right” because courts have consistently interpreted 
the Hobbs Act beyond the common law meaning of extortion to reflect the 
evolution of society. Additionally, because the Hobbs Act’s “under color 
of official right” language is ambiguous, courts should interpret the words 
in the manner that benefits society most. Therefore, courts should treat 
non-incumbent candidates for public office as public officials who can 
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) of the Hobbs Act by accepting bribes in return 
for a promise of future action. 
                                                                                                                     
 206. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 225. 
 207. Laws like the FECA, see supra notes 78–82, explain how to seek political campaign 
contributions in this traditional setting.  
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